1. INTRODUCTION Negotiations often take time, thereby delaying the implementation of agreements which are to the mutual advantage of the bargaining partners.
If the negotiators are all impatient, then these delayed agreements must be inefficient, as all participants must strictly prefer an immediate agreement on the same terms. The inefficiency of delayed agreements poses an important explanatory question: Why would the eventual terms not be proposed and accepted at the outset if the mutual losses could be foreseen? This problem has a long history in economics, going back at least as far as Hicks [14] . One consequence of Hicks's authoritative formulation is that this theoretical problem has historically been linked to the empirically important (but special) questions of why and when strikes occur. (See, in particular, Kennan's [15] extensive survey. ) We present an explanation of delay that, in contrast to the existent literature, is based on the assumption that the bargaining process has a non stationary structure. The bargaining models based on Rubinstein [20] are structurally stationary in the sense that the set of offers which players are allowed to make and accept in any subgame are independent of the history of rejected offers which lead to the subgame (see, in particular, Shaked and Sutton [21 ] ).I
The subsequent literature has primarily explained delay by modifying Rubinstein's model without changing this stationary structure. Most of the related literature assumes that at least one of the negotiators has some private information." There are a few models with complete information, however, which also explain delay. Dekel [5] demonstrated that the stable outcomes of a two-period, simultaneous move bargaining game may all involve delay. Fershtman et al. [8] showed that if players bargain over partitions of a lottery and payoffs are non-linear in the probabilities, then players may delay agreement until after the uncertainty is resolved. Fernandez and Glazer [7] and Haller and Holden [12] have shown that a union-firm bargaining game in which unions can strike (wasting social value) and there is no bargaining friction (because agreements can be backdated) may have solutions in which the union strikes: a party which offers the eventually agreed-upon terms immediately can be credibly punished by rejection, followed by a strike and/or the selection of an immediateagreement equilibrium which is very unfavorable to the deviating proposer. A delay can also be obtained in a bargaining game with more than two players if and only if stationarity of strategies is not assumed (see an example by Shaked in [18, p. 63 
]).
This paper presents a nonstationary complete information two-person bargaining model which exhibits delayed settlements. Our explanation of delay is based on the interaction of two features in the model: a deadline beyond which there remains no surplus to divide, and the assumption that a player cannot accept a lower share of the surplus than it has previously rejected. We call the latter assumption "endogenous commitment" to 1 Thus "structural" nonstationarity, which we consider in this paper, differs from the "strategic" nonstationarity which implies that local strategies are allowed to be historydependent (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein [18, p.46] ). 2 There are two alternative explanations in this tradition, depending on whether the informed or the uninformed player makes all of the offers. Thus, in a separating equilibrium, an uninformed proposer sorts the responder's types by delaying its more favorable offers; whereas a privately informed "strong" proposer demonstrates its strength by delaying its offers. The literature includes Admati and Perry [I], Ausubel and Deneckere [2] , Cramton [4] , Fudenberg et al. [9] , Gul et al. [II], Gul and Sonnenshein [10] , Hart [13] , Sobel and Takahashi [22] , and Vincent [25] . See Kennan and Wilson [16] for a recent detailed survey of this literature.
highlight the property that each player's chosen offers determine its partner's ability to commit (by rejection) to subsequent minimal demands. Endogenous commitment crucially breaks with the stationary structure of previous bargaining models, since the set of offers which a player is allowed to accept in a subgame depends on the history of rejected offers.
The interaction of these features explains agreements which are delayed till the deadline as the unique solution of our game (for sufficiently high discount factors). We will call this property the deadline effect.
The simplest interpretation of a fixed deadline is of a surplus which disappears after a certain time for exogenous reasons. One example of bargaining in the face of such a deadline is the negotiations between seasonal farm workers and their employers. In such cases the negotiators cannot feasibly agree to "stop the clock" if agreement has not been reached by a prespecified deadline. In other cases, the deadline can only be changed by agreement with other parties: for example, the baseball season can only be delayed by renegotiating with TV companies, inter alia; and these renegotiations would be so costly that, in equilibrium, the deadline is (in effect) exogenously fixed.
We want to interpret the endogenous commitment assumption in terms of the negotiators' prestige (cf. the explanations Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker [19] attribute to labor negotiators): Imagine that unionmanagement negotiations are conducted by representatives (possibly professionals) on both sides, but that offers are public knowledge (in particular to their principals). If a representative rejects an offer of $x and subsequently agrees to an offer of $y < x then he will have problems "explaining" his negotiation strategy to the union (or to the management). He may then suffer a reputation loss that exceeds his payoff from one particular negotiation. Given such a loss, the representative will never accept an offer which is worse than the one he has already rejected. An alternative interpretation is that the players' evaluation of any offer depends on their reference point (see Tversky and Kahneman [24] ). The rejection of an offer changes the players' reference point as they measure future offers relative to the offer they have already rejected. Players, in addition, might suffer a disutility from accepting an offer which gives them less than they already rejected in the past. This is, however, only a suggestive interpretation which is not formalized in the paper.
Our results state that bargaining games with deadlines and endogenous commitments may explain the deadline effect. Specifically we will demonstrate that any such bargaining game possesses a critical discount factor, below 1, such that the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome exhibits agreements which are delayed until the last period whenever the discount factor exceeds this critical value. Clearly, this outcome is inefficient if the discount factor is less than I, but it is not susceptible to Hicks's critique: if a player offered the (commonly known) eventually agreed division of the pie earlier in the game, then the other player would reject this offer (thereby changing the set of possible outcomes of the game) because rejection must lead to a subsequent agreement which is more favorable to the responder.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains a statement and proof of our main result: that bargaining continues until the deadline if the discount factor is close enough (but less than) one. Section 4 demonstrates by example that players may prefer to be the responder rather than the proposer in the first period if the discount factor is low enough that there is an immediate agreement. Section 5 concludes with a suggestion that our model sheds light on relative settlement probabilities under conventional and final offer arbitration.
FRAMEWORK AND NOTATION
Consider a complete information bargaining game in which a pie of unit size is to be divided between two risk-neutral players, denoted I and 2. If the players agree on a division, then each obtains its agreed share. If they fail to agree, then both receive zero. We follow the standard sequential bargaining approach (Rubinstein [20] ) in assuming that offers are made sequentially, and that the game ends once an offer has been accepted.
We index periods by t = I, 2, 3, ... and assume, crucially, that there is a finite deadline, which we denote by T. If no agreement has been reached by the end of period T then neither player receives any share of the pie. We further assume that players share a common discount factor 0~b < I, i.e., players are indifferent between getting bx now and getting x next period.
The game proceeds as follows: In each period t, a fair lottery determines the identity of the proposer.' The proposer then offers a division of the pie, which the other player either accepts of rejects. The game ends either if t = T or if an offer is accepted; otherwise the game proceeds to period t + l.
In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the set of offers which a player can accept in period t depends on those offers which it has previously rejected. Specifically:
Assumption I (Endogenous Commitment). If a player refuses an offer of some share of the surplus then it is committed to reject any subsequent offer of a smaller share of the surplus. Let x, and y, respectively denote the maximal share that players I and 'The procedure for selecting proposers is identical to that suggested by Binrnore [3] .
2 have rejected in periods prior to t. Assumption 1 states that player 1 (respectively 2) must reject any offer X<X, (respectively Y< y,) in period t.
Standard models of sequential bargaining have the following stationary structure: the set of offers which a player can accept in any period is independent of the offers which it has previously rejected. Endogenous commitment breaks with this stationary structure, since rejection of an offer commits the player to reject any worse offer subsequently.
We will focus on games of length T which start with no prior commitments: that is, Xl = Y 1 = O. However, in order to characterize such games,
we analyze a wider class of games which start with arbitrary commitments x and y. We will call such a game GT(x, y) (suppressing its implicit dependence on the discount factor 0). Player i's pure strategies in G T(.~' y) specify both the offer y I that it would make and its response to offers received, x., in every subgame starting in period t -1. Player 2's pure strategies in G T(X, y) are defined analogously. Both players are allowed to use mixed strategies. We will analyze G T(.~' y) by characterizing its subgame perfect equilibria, which we will henceforth refer to as "equilibria." PROPOSITION 
Every game GT(x, y) possesses an equilibrium.
Our proof uses the finite number of periods and the sequential structure of the game to show that, with an appropriate selection of choices at points where a player is indifferent, players maximize a value function with a welldefined maximum in every subgame. Details of the proof are relegated to the Appendix.
Our explanation of equilibrium delay requires a combination of endogenous commitment and a deadline. It is easy to confirm that, without endogenous commitment, any T-period game, with T> 1 and 0 < 1, would possess a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which negotiations end in the first period with the proposer obtaining 1 -0/2. On the other hand, as we subsequently show, if 0 < 1 then the game G ex; (0, 0) has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the players immediately agree that the responder receives a share of 0/2. In sum, neither endogenous commitment nor a deadline alone can explain why agreements are reached in the last perod available for bargaining. We show that the combination of endogenous commitment and a deadline explains delay for large o. In addition, we provide an example that shows that these two hypotheses change the offers that would be accepted immediately for small o.
DELAYS AND DEADLINE EFFECTS
Suppose that no agreement has been reached prior to the last period, T, and let (x T , YT) respectvely denote the most generous offers that players t and 2 have rejected before period T. Rejection of the period T offer would result in zero shares for both players, so that the subgame has a unique equilibrium in which player 1 would offer Yr (respectively, player 2 would offer x r) if selected as period T proposer, and each responder would accept. Since the identity of the period T proposer is determined randomly, the expected share of the first player is~(1 -Yr+ x r ), while the expected share of the second player is~(1 -X r + Y r). bE (b(x, y, T), 1) , then G r(x, y) has no equilibrium in which an offer is accepted in the first period with positive probability.
PROPOSITION 2 (Delay). For any game Gr(x, y) with
Proof Suppose, contrary to Proposition 2, that there is b close to 1 for which Cr(x, y) has an equilibrium in which the first period offer is accepted with positive probability. Consider firstly the case where player I's offer of y E [0, 1] is accepted by player 2. (Note that the endogenous commitment assumption implies that .f':;::: y.) We will now specify some necessary conditions that y must satisfy to be on an equilibrium path:
(i) Player 2 must (weakly) prefer to accept the offer y than to reject it. If it rejects the offer then it can guarantee itself the expected share 1(1 -x + .Y) in equilibrium by rejecting all offers before T and repeating the offer x whenever it proposes. Thus, since it prefers to accept )" it must be that
(ii) When selecting its period 1 offer, player 1 can analogously guarantee itself the expected share of~(1 -y + x) by delaying agreement till the last period. Since, by hypothesis, player I's ofTer of S' is accepted with positive probability in period 1, 1 -Y must exceed player 1's payoff from delay, i.e., (2) We will now show that, for b close enough to I, there is no S' that satisfies both necessary conditions (1) and (2). Rearranging (1) and (2) yields the following necessary condition: One can repeat this argument for the case in which the second player is the proposer and define £5 2(x, y, T) analogously. Finally, if £5(x, y, T) ==
Max{£5,(x,y, T),£5 2(x,y, T)}, then for £5E[£5(x,y,T),l)
there is no equilibrium with agreement in the first period. I Proposition 2 implies that there will be a delay in reaching an agreement for £5 sufficiently close to 1. Thus impatient players may not reach immediate agreement, contrary to the well-known property of standard complete information bargaining games. This features relies on our assumptions of endogenous commitment and a finite deadline. In our model any proposer must make a more generous offer to induce the other player to accept than in standard bargaining games, for our assumptions imply that rejection of an olTer raises the minimum share that the responser can guarantee itself by delaying agreement till the last period. Consequently, an olTer must be sufficiently generous that this additional elTect is dominated. Now the higher is £5, the more generous must an offer be for the responser to prefer acceptance, as in standard bargaining models. Endogenous commitment implies, in addition, that the minimum payolTs which the proposer and the responder can guarantee themselves each increase with £5; so the proposer becomes more reluctant to make an olTer generous enough to induce acceptance as £5 increases. Proposition 2 demonstrates that these two requirements for immediate agreement are inconsistent when £5 is close enought to 1. Proof We can repeat the proof of Proposition 2 for the game GT (.i, ji) . The left-hand side of the necessary condition (4) is strictly increasing in both x and y; so, for fixed b, if the inequality fails for (x, y), then it must also fail for any (x, y) such that x~x and y~y. I Lemma I indicates that GT(x, y) has an important monotonicity property wich we will exploit below. If we interpret x and y as prior concessions, then for fixed £5 and T, if (x, y) are insufficient for immediate agreement then any (x, y) which exhibit smaller concessions are also insufficient for immediate agreement. PROPOSITION 
If GT(.~' y) has an equilibrium in which player l's offer
of y is rejected with positive probability in period 1 then (4 ) Similarly, if GT(X, y) has an equilibrium in which player 2's offer of .x is rejected in period 1, then ( 
5)
Proof Player 1 can guarantee itself a payolT of bT(x+ 1-y)/2 by deferring agreement till the last period. Player 1 knows that if player 2 rejects an olTer of J\ then player 2 can guarantee itself a payoff of bTU' + l-x)/2. Since the pie is of size 1 and 15< 1, player 1 cannot expect to get more than 1 -(F( CO + 1 -x )/2) after player 2 rejects its olTer of y. Therefore, making an offer J; that is rejected is part of an equilibrium only if
Rearranging (6) yields inequality (4) . Similarly, it is easy to confirm that, if the second player makes an olTer
x that is rejected by player 1, then inequality (5) must hold. I Remark 1. Notice that the argument employed in proving Proposition 3 can be repeated for every subgame. Consequently, if the equilibrium path reaches any subgame with endogenous commitments (x., y r) and an olTer of } is rejected, then .v must satisfy } -y,~2(l _ (jT ')/(jT-'.
We are now ready to state our main result.
THEOREM 1 (Deadline ElTect). For every game GT(O,O) there is a e5( T) E (0, I) such that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of G T(O, 0) is characterized by delaying agreement till the last period for every bE (e5( T), 1). The unique equilibrium expected payoff to each player in
Proof We will first show that if 8 is high enough then there cannot be agreement in equilibrium before the deadline. We will then demonstrate that, for such 8, the proposer in each period before T will offer a zero share (which is, of course, rejected).
Choose an arbitrary pair (x, y) which satisfies°< x, y < 1 and x + y < 1. 
Let e5 1 (x, y, T)=max 8(x, y, r).

2(1-15 T )
.
The left hand side of (10) is strictly monotonic in <5; so, using the boundary conditions, it is obvious that b 2 (x , y, T) is unique. Furthermore, using strict rnonotonicity, (9) and (10), it is clear that for all <5 E (b 2 (x , y, T), I ),
2(1-(V) .
T <5 T < mm(x, y). (II)
Hence, for <5 > b 2 (x , y, T) and every I~t < T, we obtain that x, < x and y,<y. Now define
If <5 > b( T) then GT(O, 0) has no equilibrium path on which either x, > x or y, > y for t < T. Consequently, using Proposition 2, Remark I, and Lemma I, whenever <5 > b( T) there cannot be an equilibrium of GT (O, 0) with agreement before period T. Finally we characterize the equilibrium path for <5 large enough. We claim that, on the equilibrium path, no player otTers a positive share prior to the final period T. In order to prove this we only need to show that there is no period t in which a player makes an otTer x> x, or y > y, which is rejected by the other player. To see this, consider period T -1. Clearly no player can benefit from proposing x> x T _ I (or y> y T _ ,) as this will lower its expected payoffs in the last period. We can now go backward and argue the same for period T -2 as players have in mind that no improved offers are made at period T -1 and analogously for all periods t < T of 
GT(O, 0).4 Since
THE EFFECT OF ENDOGENOUS COMMITMENT ON IMMEDIATE AGREEMENTS
We now turn to discount factors which are close to zero, where it is clear that the only equilibrium involves immediate agreement. Indeed there would be no delays if <5 is less than 1/2, as a proposal of say, 1/2, would be accepted immediately and would dominate any proposal leading to a delay. To see this, note that the responder would accept an offer of 1/2 even if it expected to receive all the pie in the next period conditional on rejection, while the proposer's discounted value of any delayed agreement must be less than 1/2. Hence, for b less than 1/2, some period 1 offer would be accepted.
The purpose of this section is to argue that if <5 is sufficiently low that the players agree immediately, then the proposer must make a more generous offer to a responder which endogenously commits than to a responder which does not commit. Moreover, the equilibrium offer may be so generous that a player would ex ante prefer to be a responder than a proposer (whereas players always prefer to make offers in standard bargaining games such as Rubinstein [20J) .
To illustrate this claim, consider a two-period bargaining game, G 2(0, 0), absent endogenous commitment. One can easily verify that the unique equilibrium outcome has the first period responder accepting an otTer of (j/2 which is the discounted value to either player of rejection. By contrast, a responder which endogenously commits would reject an otTer of (j/2, thereby guaranteeing itself a payotT of (j( I + (j/2 )/2, which exceeds (j/2 for all (j > O. Analogously, any otTer which is acceptable in period 1 must exceed <5/2. Specifically, any otTer of y which is immediately accepted must satisfy
which implies that a period 1 otTer is only accepted if y~(j/ (2 -(j) . The proposer can delay agreement by otTering zero, yielding it an expected payotT of (j/2. Hence a necessary and sufficient condition for immediate acceptance in equilibrium is (13) Inequality (13) only holds for (j~3 -}5. Now note that for (j = 2/3 the otTer (j/(2 -(j) allocates the pie equally between the players and that it is the responder that gets the larger share if (j > 2/3. Consequently, for (j E (2/3, 3 -.J5J, there is an immediate agreement and each player prefers to be a responder than a proposer, contrary to results in standard bargaining games without endogenous commitment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our results depend on the interaction between two features of our model: the existence of a deadline and endogenous commitment. Absent a deadline, the other assumption cannot explain delay. To see this, notice that the following strategies constitute an equilibrium for any 15: player 1 (the period 1 proposer) otTers YI=max(Y,l' (j/2) in any period t when it proposes (where Yo = 0); player 2 otTers XI = max(x,. l ' (j/2) in any period t when it proposes (where X o = 0); player 1 accepts XI itT X,~(j/2, while player 2 accepts YI itT y,~(j/2. Notice that this equilibrium supports an immediate agreement to the Rubinstein [20J division of the surplus. It is also well known that there is immediate agreement in equilibrium 'whenever 15 < 1 and there is no endogenous commitment.
We assume for convenience that the proposer is randomly selected each period. However, it is easy to see that our result only depends on the assumptions that the period T proposer is randomly selected and that the responder cannot accept offers less generous than those it has rejected in previous periods. 5 Our model is therefore potentially applicable to bargaining situations in which players (say) alternate offers for up to T -I periods, after which the dispute is sent to arbitration. An associated literature asks whether agreements to refer unsettled issues to arbitration tend to "chill" bargaining, reducing the likelihood of a negotiated settlement (cr. Stevens [23] ), and largely attributes negotiation failures to inconsistent beliefs about the arbitrated outcome. However, Farber and Bazerman's [6] evidence suggests that this explanation may be difficult to reconcile with the stylized fact that settlement probabilities are higher under final-offer than under conventional arbitration. Farber and Bazerman suggest, rather, that their evidence might be explained by a reluctance to concede when all offers can be presented to the arbitrator (as in American public sector interest arbitration]." Farber and Bazerman do not model the precise way in which these concessions affect the arbitrator's award. We provide a simple model of this situation, in which the arbitrator ignores all but the most favorable concessions and randomizes between them, and demonstrate that this may result in (costly) arbitration even if all parameters are common knowledge.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPosmON I
The sequential structure of GT(X, y) implies that every subgame involves a single-person decision problem over either a finite or a compact set, given equilibrium play in the remainder of the game. We will use a recursion argument to show that for every subgame we can construct a value function with a well defined maximum which is consistent with equilibrium play in the remainder of the game.
Denote a subgame of GT(x, y), starting in period t by (x., y" t), where x, and YI represent the maximum rejected olTer in periods I~s~t and t indicates the subgame starting period (we suppress in this notation other details of the history preceding t). We proceed in two steps, first showing 'An alternative selling is an alternate offer model with a stochastic deadline. The game ends in period T with probability 0.5 or in period T + I with probability 0.5. We believe that such a setting yields similar results.
that (X" y" t) possesses an equilibrium if the set of subgames (x, +1, YI + " t + I) satisfies a certain condition, and then proving that the condition holds in all subgames.
Suppose firstly that every subgame (XI + l ' YI + I' t + I) has an equilibrium. Define V;+,(xI+!,Y,+d as player i's equilibrium payoff in some equilibrium of the subgame (X'+I' YI+" t+ 1). Suppose that player I is selected as the proposer in period t and let Y denote its offer. Player 2's best response satisfies Accept (resp. Reject) if Y> (resp < ) Max{JV;+ , (x" max(y, y,) ), y,} and mix between Accept and Reject otherwise. Since oV;+ l( ) is well defined, the subgame following player l's offer of y in period t has an optimal response for every y. Player 2's optimal responses partition the [0,1] interval into yA, yR, and yM: the set of offers that it accepts, rejects, and completely mixes, respectively. We define yl = {Y E [0, 1] I y = 0V; + I (x., y)}, so that YM c;; YI.
We now turn to player I's (the proposer) optimal strategy at period t. Player i's best offer(s) would be well defined if V~+ I(X" y) were continuous in y; but unfortunately, as we demonstrate below, this is typically not the case. Instead we will show that, under certain conditions, these discontinuities only arise at points where a player is either indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer, or between making an offer which would be accepted and another offer which would be rejected. We will show that we can select the players' decisions at such points so that V~+ I (x" y) possesses a local maximum at the upper part of the jump, which will imply that player 1 has a best offer in period t.
Using our analysis of player 2's optimal response, player 1's payoff from offering y~y I is therefore
The subgame (x" y" t) with the first player as the proposer therefore has an equilibrium if arg max X,(y) exists. The key observations underlying our proof of existence are If yE yR U y' then 1 -y > OV~+ 1(.\"" y).
(
PI)
If XI Lv A ) = X,(yR) for any pair )"4 E yA and y R E yR then yA > oV;+ I(X" yR).
(P2)
To confirm (PI) note that player 2 can only weakly prefer to reject y if it anticipates a higher share in some future period (as 0 < 1), which entails a correspondingly lower share for player 1. An analogous argument implies (P2). ) is discontinuous at y E Yl. On the other hand (P2) implies that V;+ I(X" y) is discontinuous if the subgame (x,; y, t + 1) has an equilibrium in which, with positive probability, the path reaches some (xs> Ys> s), s~t + 1, at which player 1 is indifferent between making an offer y 1 which player 2 would accept and an offer y2 which player 2 would reject. Thus (P2) implies that X,(y) may also be discontinuous at some ye yR. Let yR denote the (possibly empty) set of ye yR such that X,( ) is discontinuous and there exists an equilibrium path of the subgame {x., y, t} on which with positive probability We claim that if (A), then X,(y) has a well defined maximum whenever players adopt the following (altruistic) tie-breaking rule:
(R) Whenever a player is indifferent between two strategies it selects the one which the other player prefers. That is, whenever a player is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer it will accept (cf. (PI» and whenever a player is indifferent between making an offer which would be accepted and an offer which would be rejected it chooses the one that would be accepted (d. (P2».
Intuitively, rule (R) guarantees that if V~+ I (XI + I' y) were discontinuous at y, then V~+ 1( ) would have a local maximum: that is, V~+ I (x, + 1 , n is defined as the upper value of the discontinuous jump. Since yA is bounded below, y* =inf{YE yA} is well defined. Assumption (A) implies that y* =
